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European Review

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27 March 1985

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27 March 1985*

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European Review

25X1

27 March 1985

	<i>Page</i>	
Briefs		25X6
Portugal: Eanista Party Launched	1	25X1
Turkey-Syria: Cosmetic Improvement in Relations	2	25X1
Romania: Responding to Energy Shortages	2	25X1
Articles		
Western Europe: Changing Perspectives on Central America	5	25X1
Most West European political leaders are viewing the Salvadoran Government in a positive light, and they are becoming increasingly disillusioned with Nicaragua's failure to move toward democracy. Leftist governments and the Socialist International (SI), however, continue to criticize US policy toward Nicaragua. Some West European leaders—particularly the more conservative ones—admit that Soviet interference has aggravated the political turmoil in the Central American countries, but the vast majority believe that tensions in the region are primarily the result of social and economic imbalances. To promote stability and democracy in the region, the European Community (EC) is preparing a cooperation agreement, but we believe that increases in EC development assistance for the region will be small.		25X1
	9	25X6

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25X1

25X6

Bulgaria: Renewed Assimilation Campaign Against Ethnic Turks 17

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The Zhivkov regime, at least since December, has stepped up a longstanding campaign to force assimilation of its fast-growing ethnic Turkish population. The Army and militia have been summoned to control resulting violence as well as to continue the campaign to "Slavicize" names in heavily Turkish regions around Kurdzhali and much of the northeastern section of the country. President Zhivkov will try hard to avoid any Western criticism of this latest repression, but he is not likely to ease up significantly for long.

25X1

Turkey: The Bulgarian Turkish Minority 21

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25X1

The Bulgarian Government's policy of forcing ethnic Turks to adopt Bulgarian names is embarrassing the Turkish Government, and public indignation in Turkey is running high. Ethnic minorities represent a longstanding and emotional domestic question for Turkey, and one likely to continue to trouble its relations with its neighbors. Although the government is adopting a more vigorous defense of the Bulgarian Turks, Ankara will be slow to take any action that will significantly damage its recently improved relations with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

25X1

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Secret

25X1

Looking Ahead	25
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Publications of Interest	27
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items will be designated as uncoordinated views.


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Briefs

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**Portugal****Eanista Party Launched**

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After several false starts, supporters of President Eanes have launched a new party that will compete against the Socialists and Social Democrats. The party, called Democratic Renewal, is ideologically amorphous, but appears to be taking on a center-left political orientation.

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Party leaders have ruled out a coalition with the Communist Party, but have left the door open to some form of cooperation with it.

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The timing of the announcement and statements by party leaders suggest that the organizers may be anticipating that Eanes will dismiss the government following the party's founding Congress in May and call early parliamentary elections. To

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27 March 1985*

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succeed, the party will need the President's active support, which he has yet to give. If Eanes decides to gamble, and the party does well in the elections that would follow within three months, it would be an influential force in the presidential contest in December. The party probably would not win a majority in the parliamentary election, however, which portends more coalition government and continued governmental instability. []

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Turkey-Syria**Cosmetic Improvement in Relations**

Recent consultations in Damascus between Turkey and Syria on border security resulted in a slight but probably cosmetic improvement in relations. The Turkish Foreign Ministry, describing Under Secretary Necdet Tezel's talks with Syrian Vice President Khaddam and Foreign Minister Al-Naib as a "beneficial start," disclosed that agreement had been reached to establish a dialogue on, among others, border security—shorthand for the control of smuggling and terrorist movements. Tezel's visit was proposed by Syrian President Assad in response to a warning message sent late last year by President Evren, which reportedly charged that Ankara strongly suspected the Syrian Government was aiding anti-Turkish terrorists, especially Armenian and Kurdish extremists. []

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The bilateral relationship—worsening steadily since 1982—appeared to have hit a low in late January, when, according to cryptic Turkish press reports, President Evren conducted an "inspection" of the Turkey-Syria border. Two weeks later, the Syrian Consul in Istanbul claimed that the post of Syrian ambassador to Ankara would soon be filled—it had then been vacant for 18 months—and denied any Syrian intention to retake the Turkish Province of Hatay, a disputed area with a large Arab minority. In mid-February, the Syrian Minister of Information referred to the need to restation Syrian troops in Lebanon along the border with Turkey—an area now sparsely defended. The agreement to begin a dialogue on border security suggests both sides have decided to brake the drift toward confrontation, but is unlikely to lessen hostility on either side significantly. []

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Romania**Responding to Energy Shortages** []

The Romanian leadership recently announced a program to boost monthly coal and oil output over already ambitious targets this spring and summer. The leadership is reacting to reduced energy supplies as Romania has been the hardest hit in Eastern Europe by this year's severe winter. Bucharest had already cut oil imports to save hard currency and then was faced by weather-related shortfalls in output of hydropower and coal. The leadership typically responds to such production problems by "storming"—mobilizing labor resources and requiring workers to work extra shifts. []

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The regime's initial response this winter—the energy conservation program announced in January—was aimed at protecting the industrial sector, particularly production of export goods, by further cutting energy allocations to residences, schools, and stores. Worker morale—already poor because of consumer goods shortages and the deep cuts in heat and electricity for residences—will probably worsen if the government mandates longer workweeks. The regime, however, has maintained a high level of vigilance and will be quick to respond to any signs of trouble.

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Articles

**Western Europe:
Changing Perspectives
on Central America**

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Most West European political leaders are viewing the Salvadoran Government in a positive light, and they are becoming increasingly disillusioned with Nicaragua's failure to move toward democracy. Despite their disenchantment with the Sandinistas, however, leftist governments and the Socialist International (SI) continue to criticize US policy toward Nicaragua, arguing that Washington's support of the Nicaraguan rebels is partially responsible for the Sandinistas' reluctance to undertake democratic reforms and for their growing dependence on the Soviet Union. They also have charged that US pressure on Nicaragua has contributed to the current stagnation in the Contadora negotiations. Although some West European leaders—particularly the more conservative ones—admit that Soviet interference has aggravated the political turmoil in the Central American countries, the vast majority believe that tensions in the region are primarily the result of social and economic imbalances. To promote stability and democracy in the region, the European Community (EC) is preparing a political and economic cooperation agreement with Central America, but we believe that increases in EC development assistance for the region will be small because of continuing budget problems.

Changing Government Views on El Salvador . . .

West European governments are looking much more favorably upon El Salvador since last year's election of Napoleon Duarte. West Germany has assigned an ambassador to El Salvador and has renewed development assistance, discontinued in 1979. Bonn has authorized a \$16 million credit, but it is not extending grants, partly because of continuing

widespread opposition in West Germany to the Salvadoran regime. London, after a five-year break, also has resumed a small aid program for El Salvador, and it has offered to train Salvadoran officers in British military academies.

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The Italian Prime Minister has called the election of Duarte a "victory for democracy," and Rome, according to US Embassy reports, plans to send food and medical aid to El Salvador amounting to about \$3 million. Italy also has indicated that it wants to develop a bilateral development program and is awaiting project proposals from the Salvadoran Government—particularly in the areas of energy, agriculture, and public health. Italian Foreign Ministry officials have suggested that the program may be similar to a recent \$25 million technical cooperation agreement with Costa Rica.

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France, which had been one of the harshest critics of the Salvadoran regime, has decided to name an ambassador for El Salvador, and it has publicly expressed its support for the dialogue between President Duarte and the insurgents. According to US Embassy reports, however, Quai officials are skeptical about the prospects for a national reconciliation as long as the Duarte government refuses the insurgents' demand for power sharing. They believe, moreover, that the failure of insurgent leader Villalobos to participate in the dialogue may indicate that the Democratic Revolutionary Front—the political arm of the insurgent movement—cannot speak for the guerrillas.

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EUR ER 85-008
27 March 1985

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The Netherlands' nonresident Ambassador to El Salvador, in conversations with US officials, has emphasized the positive political and economic changes that have taken place under the new government. He also has acknowledged that insurgents, rather than rightist groups, are responsible for the recent surge in political killings. The Ambassador noted, however, that the Dutch media and the general public continue to believe that the Salvadoran Government has made no progress on the human rights front—a view that is shared by other West European publics. []

... and Nicaragua

Disappointment among West European governments over the Sandinistas' failure to build a pluralistic political system has grown steadily over the past two years. Even last November's election was widely perceived as undemocratic because of the lack of participation by the principal opposition parties. According to US Embassy reports, the suspension of the dialogue between the Sandinistas and all the opposition parties and increasing press censorship after the election have strengthened the impression among many West European leaders that Nicaragua is sliding toward totalitarianism. The low-level representation of West European governments—even Socialist ones—at President Ortega's inauguration in January is a good indicator of the growing disenchantment with the Sandinistas. []

Declining West European support for Managua is also reflected in aid cuts. West Germany last year froze \$40 million in export credits; Spain, which has a sizable assistance program in Nicaragua, reportedly told the Sandinistas shortly after the election that it may not extend new aid. Although these decisions were partially prompted by Managua's default on debt service payments, West German and Spanish officials also cited the Sandinistas' failure to move toward democracy. The Netherlands—Managua's principal source of Western assistance—will allow its five-year program to lapse at the end of 1985, and plans significant aid increases for democratic Costa Rica. []

France's position toward the Sandinistas has been ambiguous. Although French Government officials have privately voiced their disillusionment with

political developments in Nicaragua, then Foreign Minister Cheysson publicly praised the technical correctness of the Nicaraguan election and former presidential adviser Debray maintained that there is a relative democratization in both Nicaragua and El Salvador. French public and private assistance for Nicaragua declined from \$27 million in 1982 to \$18 million in 1984, but there are press reports that Paris negotiated development projects in telecommunications and agriculture with Managua during the visit of Nicaraguan Vice President Ramirez in January. []

Italy, France, and Canada last January agreed to finance a \$50 million expansion of a geothermal facility northeast of Managua. Italy and Canada probably see their assistance as multilateral development aid and not as an endorsement of the Sandinistas. Prime Minister Craxi's dismay over Nicaragua's protection of Italian terrorists may yet cause Italy to distance itself from the project. The EC also agreed last September to fund regional development projects that include Nicaragua, but more out of concern for balanced economic development in the Central American region than from a desire to bolster the Sandinista regime. []

The Socialist International

The Socialist International's (SI) perceptions of political developments in El Salvador and Nicaragua are similar to those of West European governments. Secretary General Vaananen recently said that the SI is prepared to cooperate with Duarte and that his leadership has created a promising climate for progress in El Salvador. He indicated, however, that the SI still supports a political role for Guillermo Ungo as the best representative of the democratic left. []

Regarding Nicaragua, Vaananen stated that the SI recognized the "non-social-democratic" character of the Sandinista regime. Growing SI disapproval of the Sandinistas was reflected in the absence of important Socialist leaders at President Ortega's inauguration and Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez's reception of opposition leader Arturo Cruz at his private residence.

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According to US Embassy reports, many participants in last October's SI Congress in Rio de Janeiro blamed the Sandinistas for the failure of negotiations with Cruz on conditions for the Democratic Coordinating Board's participation in the Nicaraguan election. Despite evident disaffection with the Sandinistas, however, the SI's official report on the election in Nicaragua was fairly positive and even recommended increased aid for Managua—partly, we believe, to strengthen the position of the Ortega brothers, who are perceived to be more open to democratic reform, against Marxist-Leninist hardliners. [REDACTED]

Criticism of US Policy

A more important explanation for the SI's continuing public support of the Sandinistas, in our opinion, can be found in its strong condemnation of US policy toward Nicaragua. Many West European Socialists believe that US support of the Nicaraguan rebels and Nicaraguan fear of an invasion have made it very difficult for the Sandinista government to build democratic institutions. Swedish Prime Minister Palme, prominent West German Social Democrat Wischniewski, and Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez have all spoken out against US policy, charging that it is in violation of international law and comparable to Soviet actions in Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

The Socialists' disapproval of US policy is also shared by some more conservative politicians. The Dutch Foreign Minister, while conceding Sandinista shortcomings, has condemned perceived US efforts to drive them from office. [REDACTED]

Concern About Contadora

According to US Embassy reports, West European political leaders are becoming increasingly concerned about the growing stagnation in the Contadora negotiations, which they have strongly supported as the only viable means for achieving lasting peace and democracy in Central America. Many concede that differences in interests and perspectives among the Central American countries and the four Contadora mediator states are partially to blame for the stalling

of the peace talks. Many West European leaders, however, also believe that US policy toward Nicaragua is delaying the signing of the Contadora draft treaty. The Dutch Foreign Minister, for example, has charged that the lack of serious negotiations within Contadora partially stems from US pressure on Nicaragua's neighbors to make harsh demands on the Sandinistas. According to press reports, a number of West European governments—including those in Paris, Madrid, The Hague, and Dublin—are urging Washington to resume the Manzanillo talks to achieve a reconciliation with the Sandinistas. [REDACTED]

Questions About a San Jose Followup

The slowdown in the Contadora negotiations has raised questions in the EC about the desirability of holding a followup meeting to last September's conference in San Jose between EC foreign ministers and their Central American counterparts. The purpose of last year's meeting was to strengthen the Contadora process and achieve peace and stability through regional economic development. Italian Foreign Ministry officials have stated that the cancellation of the Contadora meeting in Panama has embarrassed the EC and that a continuation of the EC–Central American dialogue would depend on progress in the Contadora negotiations. [REDACTED]

Meanwhile, EC Commissioner Cheysson's plan to conclude an economic and political cooperation agreement with the five Central American states and Panama by June is also running into difficulties.

There is a divergence of opinion within the Commission about the content of the document to be presented to the Council of Ministers, particularly the section on political cooperation. Cheysson believes that political aspects should be emphasized in the cooperation agreement, and he has proposed annual political meetings similar to those that have evolved with the ASEAN countries. Some of his fellow commissioners, however, fear that a strong political focus would cause EC member states to interfere too much in the implementation of the agreement.

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Cheysson has promised to redraft the political section of the document, but the framework proposal is likely to face difficult passage in the Council. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Most West European governments are unlikely to condemn Managua publicly, fearing the political backlash from their publics who hold considerable sympathies for the Sandinistas. Leftist governments and the SI also will continue to regard US policy toward Nicaragua as a partial reason for the Sandinistas' failure to implement democratic reforms. Even more conservative governments probably would criticize US military action against Managua in the absence of a clear provocation. Moreover, many West European leaders are likely to blame Washington if the Contadora negotiations fail. If, on the other hand, a treaty is signed, West European governments probably will support it regardless of its contents.

[REDACTED]

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France and Spain, which have shown the greatest interest in Central America, may assume a lower profile in the region. Prime Minister Gonzalez faces strong domestic opposition to Spain's membership in NATO [REDACTED]

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France's foreign policy priorities lie elsewhere, particularly in Western Europe and Africa. [REDACTED]

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Completion of an EC cooperation agreement with Central America probably will take longer than originally envisioned, and its economic provisions are likely to be disappointing for the Central Americans. As yet, no financial protocol or trade concessions have been worked out. Because increases in EC development assistance are likely to be small, the EC probably will ask member states to increase their bilateral assistance for the region. [REDACTED]

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Bulgaria: Renewed Assimilation Campaign Against Ethnic Turks

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The Zhivkov regime, at least since last December, has stepped up a longstanding campaign to force assimilation of its fast-growing ethnic Turkish population. The Army and militia have been summoned to control resulting violence as well as to continue the campaign to "Slavicize" names in heavily Turkish regions around Kurdzhali and much of the northeastern section of the country. President Zhivkov will try hard to avoid any Western criticism of this latest repression, but he is not likely to ease up significantly for long.

The Ethnic Turk Problem

Bulgaria's Turkish minority, comprising approximately 10 percent of its population of about 9 million, is made up of the descendants of settlers who migrated to the area during the five centuries of Ottoman rule. Mostly peasant farmers and artisans, few are active in the political system or in any other national institution.

The regime has had little success in assimilating this fast-growing group, which it badly needs to augment its stagnant national labor force but which it fears as a serious threat to national integration. The ethnic Turks, with an annual population growth rate of 1.5 to 2 percent, are increasing their numbers about 10 times faster than Slavic Bulgarians. Since 1977, some 60,000 of the country's roughly 850,000 Turks have emigrated, which has further depleted the agricultural work force. According to Bulgarian statistics, the number of agricultural workers, which had been rising since 1975, dropped in 1977 and 1978; we believe that this two-year decline may reflect the emigration of ethnic Turks.

Central Issues

The ethnic Turk presence raises four distinct problems for the Bulgarian Government:

- *Nationalistic.* Ethnic Turks, with their separate culture and language and with their outright rejection of Slavic nationalistic symbols, challenge

the legitimacy of the Zhivkov regime. In the past few years, the Zhivkov regime has tried to gain legitimacy by emphasizing political and cultural nationalism, especially while Zhivkov's late daughter Lyudmila served as Chairman of the Committee for Art and Culture.

- *Political.* The Turks also are perceived as a potential challenge to Bulgaria's constitutional underpinnings. The Bulgarian Constitution has no provision for regional autonomy for its ethnic groups. It does, however, refer to the right of "citizens of non-Bulgarian origin" to education in their own language, a right not now observed by the government.
- *Economic.* Most of Bulgaria's Turks live in backward rural areas, and the cost to Sofia of developing those areas would be quite high. Development itself might engender fears that ethnic Turks in outlying areas might eventually complicate the Communist party's efforts to maintain tight control.
- *Ideological.* The Turkish minority's language, customs, and religion are perceived by the leadership as relics of pre-Communist rule and as conflicting with the regime's goal of constructing the "new socialist man." Moreover, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism casts the Turks' Islamic faith as a potential security problem. Bulgaria's leaders may fear that the contagion of fundamentalism that has destabilized regimes elsewhere could seriously undermine public order.

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Turkish Minority Violence in Bulgaria



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Government Policy

Bulgaria's policy toward the Turkish minority has been one of discrimination and repression. The secret police has penetrated the Turkish population to ensure its continued passivity. In 1949 there were 1,199 Turkish day schools in Bulgaria with more than 100,000 students. Today there are none. The Turkish language is no longer taught in the schools, and its use is prohibited in dealings with the government. There are few Turkish students in the nation's universities and fewer still on the faculties of those schools. The practice of Islam is officially discouraged—all but one of the 1,460 mosques in the country in 1950 have been closed—and the government frowns upon use of Turkish customs. Few ethnic Turks serve in combat roles in the Bulgarian armed forces despite their being

represented there in excess of their proportion of the population; they serve, instead, in segregated labor brigades.

Nor are ethnic Turks given significant numerical representation in central party and state organs. In 1983 only one of 197 full members of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, no more than six of 139 candidate members, and 14 of 400 National Assembly members were Turkish.

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From time to time, Bulgaria has relaxed its repressive policies. On two occasions since the beginning of Communist rule, in 1950 and 1968, Bulgaria allowed its Turkish minority to emigrate. But both Bulgaria and Turkey appear to prefer gradual repatriation of Bulgarian Turks. The emigration of a large number of ethnic Turks would exacerbate Bulgaria's labor shortage and intensify the need to improve labor productivity, while Turkey resists accepting too many poor immigrants at one time. []

The Current Campaign

According to the US Embassy in Sofia, the recent renewal of the assimilation campaign may have begun as early as last spring when Sofia transferred the responsibility for the name changes from the police to the more heavyhanded militia and Army. Since last December, we have received many reports of violent resistance, including more than 400 deaths over a widespread area. Sofia has insisted that the name changes have been voluntary, but Army and militia have restricted travel in these affected regions, and, according to press reports in Turkey, Sofia recently may have temporarily closed its borders to Turkish tourists. According to Turkish diplomatic sources, Bulgarian Turks trying to telephone the Turkish Embassy in Sofia to protest the campaign are routinely cut off. As of 31 January the Bulgarian newspaper that had printed partly in Turkish and partly in Bulgarian began using Bulgarian exclusively. []

One reason for the resumption of the anti-Turk campaign may be Sofia's desire to meet its 1985 deadline for issuing new national identification cards to its citizens, a campaign said to be resisted by the Turkish minority. The effort also may be geared to end just before the start of a new national census—which Sofia hopes will not show a large Turkish minority—is undertaken in December of this year. []

Prospects

The brutality of current government efforts to force the name changes and the sealing off of affected areas shows the seriousness with which the regime is pursuing this campaign. Despite increasingly critical

foreign press coverage, the assimilation effort will remain a central preoccupation of the Zhivkov government. President Zhivkov may modify his assimilation strategy, however, if he is unable to continue warding off Western criticism of the repression. He wants better relations with the West and is worried that the papal assassination scandal and allegations of Bulgarian complicity in international drug trafficking and terrorism will further hurt his regime. But he is not likely to lessen his determination to remove what he sees as a potential threat from the ethnic Turks. []

The Turkish minority, however, shows no sign of acquiescing in the name change program—indicating a continuing challenge to Sofia. According to the US Embassy in Sofia, at least one and possibly two bombs exploded on passenger trains in Bulgaria on 9 March. Meanwhile, [] another bomb heavily damaged a train in Sliven the same day, with an uncertain number of deaths and injuries. The Embassy credits sources linking the bombing to ethnic Turks protesting Sofia's current assimilation campaign. Ethnic Turks also were prime suspects in the bombings last summer at the train station in Plovdiv and the airport at Varna. The government's apparent failure to capture the perpetrators of those operations or the ones last weekend will probably encourage further strikes. []

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**Turkey: The Bulgarian
Turkish Minority** []

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The Bulgarian Government's policy of forcing ethnic Turks to adopt Bulgarian names is embarrassing the Turkish Government, and public indignation in Turkey is running high. Ethnic minorities represent a longstanding and emotional domestic question for Turkey, and one likely to continue to trouble its relations with its neighbors. Although the government is adopting a more vigorous defense of the Bulgarian Turks, Ankara will be slow to take any action that will significantly damage its recently improved relations with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Ankara's inability to do much about the campaign could eventually impinge on US interests. []

Cautious Response

In the face of mounting public and press indignation, the government's initially restrained reaction is stiffening, but it has not altogether abandoned its earlier caution. In mid-January, President Evren sent a mildly worded note to Bulgarian leader Zhivkov. In mid-February, the government recalled its ambassador from Sofia, but agreed to allow a Grand National Assembly (GNA) debate on the subject on 20 February in a closed session. On 22 February a government spokesman announced that a protest note had been sent to Sofia. On the same day, in a significant reversal of the government's initial policy, a Foreign Ministry official told the US Embassy that it would be helpful if the United States and other friendly countries would raise the subject in the UN Human Rights Commission. Turkey intends to broach the subject in other international forums, including the Interparliamentary Union meeting in Lome and the EC-Turkish joint commission. []

The tentative nature of Turkey's initial response to the plight of the Bulgarian Turks may have been due in part to the government's puzzlement over the campaign's timing. Relations with Bulgaria had been improving, and some high-ranking officials, including the Prime Minister, alluded to the possibility that the

Western media had exaggerated the incidents to spoil Bulgarian-Turkish relations. Last year, exports to Bulgaria—albeit accounting for less than half of 1 percent of total Turkish exports—rose by approximately 38 percent. []

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Moreover, Turkey may have held back because it has much to lose by antagonizing Bulgaria. Between 5 and 6 percent of Turkey's electricity comes from Bulgaria, and its energy exports are expected to rise when a spur of the Soviet natural gas pipeline is built to serve Turkish Thrace and the Marmara region, including Istanbul. Disruption of Turkish truck traffic through Bulgaria—which obviates the need to cross Greece—could severely damage Turkey's trade with Western Europe. Finally, Ankara also fears that too strong a response might antagonize Moscow, with which it has just signed major economic agreements. []

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Turkey's initial hesitation to raise the issue on human rights grounds probably rests partly on its fear of being accused of hypocrisy, according to the US Embassy. Ankara knows that it is vulnerable to some of the same human rights complaints as Bulgaria—such as banning native language schools and publications—in its treatment of its own Kurdish, Arab, and Syriac Christian minorities. []

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The government's tentative response may be due also to serious disagreement in official circles on the best policy to follow, at least in handling the issue domestically, in the US Embassy's estimation. Some former members and sympathizers of the now-banned Nationalist Action Party—which urged irredentist policies—belong to Prime Minister Ozal's government and his Motherland Party. By contrast, President

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Evren's identification with Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement may have made it awkward for him to urge strong measures on Prime Minister Ozal. The government is already divided because of a recent corruption scandal and, more important, its failure to control inflation. []

Irredentism

The issue of Bulgarian Turks has resonance because Turkish immigrants constitute a significant group of voters. Bulgarian Turks have been migrating to Turkey since the 1920s, and family reunification schemes since 1950 have brought in several hundred thousand. Some observers claim that there are 200,000 in Istanbul alone. Along with immigrants from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Greece, they are now a significant part of western Turkey's population. Pressure groups of Bulgarian immigrants in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir have started a publicity campaign to urge government action on behalf of their oppressed brethren. []

The issue is also sensitive in Turkey because millions of Turks or Turkic peoples are living in countries other than Bulgaria. The 1979 Soviet census recorded a Turkic population of over 37 million. If one adds to them the Turks of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and elsewhere, the total number outside Turkey is probably greater than the 44,236,000 recorded in Turkey's most recent census (1979). Some of these groups—the roughly 100,000 in Greek Thrace, for example—look to Turkey as their patron and protector. []

In Turkish intellectual life, pan-Turkism sometimes has had a strong emotional response, but only twice during the past 60 years has irredentism been a major factor in Turkish policy. In 1938, Turkey annexed the southern Province of Hatay, and, in 1974, it invaded Cyprus. Although Turkey is concerned about the Turkish minorities abroad, it has been unwilling to intervene on their behalf at the expense of its relations with other states. Atatürk insisted that the political nation was to be confined strictly to those living within the republic's present borders. That has remained government policy for more than 60 years, unquestioned by the vast majority of Turkey's people,

except for the fixation on the Cypriot Turks. Ankara's policy of defining a "Turk" as anyone born within the borders of Turkey also has tended to make the idea of a "compatriot" a legal rather than a racial idea. Politically, therefore, advocates of pan-Turkism—the doctrine that all Turkic peoples ought to be under Turkish rule—have never captured the votes of the greater part of the Turkish electorate. []

However unfounded, fears of Turkish irredentism long have colored Turkey's relations with its neighbors. The senior Greek representative to the Turkish community in Thrace contends that Turkey has been encouraging irredentism among Greek and Bulgarian Muslim minorities since 1982, and that this latter-day "Ottomanism" is making Greece as well as Bulgaria nervous. According to the US Consul in Thessaloniki, members of the Turkish community of Greek Thrace, dismayed by Turkey's failure to defend the Bulgarian Turks and doubtful of Turkish protection in consequence, are considering the formation of an Islamic political party to promote their interests. An authoritative Greek source considers this a subtle instrument of Turkish irredentism, financed by Ankara, to carry the grievances of the Thracian Turks to the Greek Parliament and to international organizations such as the Council of Europe. []

The Bulgarian situation contributes to Turkey's perennial uneasiness regarding the intentions of its Soviet neighbor. The Soviet Union has long been sensitive to any hint that Turkey claims to represent Turks within Soviet borders. Prime Minister Ozal told the US Ambassador on 23 February that he worries that the Soviet Union may be behind Bulgaria's actions, linked perhaps to Soviet problems with their own Muslims in central Asia. Implying that Turkey could do nothing for the Turkic groups in the Soviet Union, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official said in February that Ankara would not want them to consider Turkey their protector in their struggles to maintain their ethnic and Muslim identity. []

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In addition, Turkey is well aware of the need for Soviet good will in dealing with its own ethnic minorities, the Kurds and the Armenians. Moscow has recently reined in its public support for the Armenian terrorist group, ASALA. In December 1984, Ozal requested Soviet Premier Tikhonov's good offices in stopping clandestine Turkish-language broadcasts from East Germany. The broadcasts, however, are continuing []

Outlook

Continued public outcry and Ankara's frustration with Bulgarian intransigence are inducing Ankara to press the cause of the Bulgarian Turks more actively, in the hope of leading Sofia to negotiate a solution to the problem. We believe Turkey would prefer, however, to have friendly nations carry the burden of putting pressure on Bulgaria. Ankara's own reactions are likely to be limited, for the time being, because it apparently still wishes to salvage what it can of its relations with Sofia, and because the government may still be uncertain of the appropriate response. Reversing its decision in February to forbid public meetings in support of the Bulgarian Turks, the government agreed to permit four "refugee organizations" to demonstrate on 21 March—the first public demonstration of any kind in Turkey since the 1980 coup. []

On 5 March the Turkish Ambassador to Bulgaria noted that the government was finding it difficult to isolate the issue from Turkish-Bulgarian relations as a whole. Ankara's publicly stated preference for emigration—specifically mentioned in its 22 February note to Sofia—represents no real solution. Most Turks evidently believe Bulgaria is unlikely to permit large-scale emigration, and some Turkish press reports have treated Ankara's offer as a cynical bluff. Turkey has decided to cut cultural and sports ties with Bulgaria, according to the Turkish ambassador in Sofia, but will not make its action public. Stronger responses were already being mooted during the closed GNA debate on 20 February, including the closure of Turkey's border to Bulgarian trucks bound for Iran and Iraq. Given the near certainty of Bulgarian retaliation, we believe that Turkey would not make such a self-defeating gesture except under extreme pressure. []

Sofia, however, has begun to deny that there are Turks in Bulgaria at all, a tactic likely to outrage Turkish public opinion further. Bulgaria's response to Turkey's note, for example, referred only to Bulgarian Muslims, not to Bulgarian Turks, implying that Bulgaria's only Muslims are the Pomaks—ethnic Bulgarians who had converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. The Turkish press on 8 March reported extensively a Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman's insistence that Turkey considers the Bulgarian Turks its kinsmen. []

Although politically secularism remains dominant, heightened Islamic consciousness has become more noticeable in Turkey in recent years, and religious conservatives may take advantage of a perceived attack on a Muslim minority abroad to press their cause with the government at home. While conscious of the limitations of a unilateral effort, Ankara apparently intends to make a propaganda campaign throughout the Islamic world a central pillar of its response to Bulgaria. Already, Turkey has drawn on its increased role in the Islamic Conference to request that some of its members make demarches to Sofia on behalf of the Bulgarian Turks. According to the Turkish Embassy in Sofia, as of 9 March, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, and Kuwait already have done so. The Turkish press continues to highlight Islamic countries' statements of support and to feature claims of contemplated action—for example, discussion by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pakistan of an economic boycott against Bulgaria. []

Over the long term, the government has few options to assist the Bulgarian Turks materially. This will damage the government's prestige, although we do not expect this issue to threaten its stability. Moreover, if as a consequence of the Bulgarian-Turkish question the Turks of Greek Thrace become a more active irritant in Turkish-Greek relations, NATO could eventually feel the repercussions. Worsening of Turkish-Greek relations for any reason is likely to impinge on NATO, because both nations tend to try to win NATO backing for their national positions on divisive bilateral issues, with sometimes disruptive effects on the alliance. []

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Looking Ahead

<i>April</i> <i>France</i>	Paris will announce <i>policy on New Caledonia</i> 10 April . . . will probably delay referendum on island's future at least until September. []	25X1
<i>Turkey-</i> <i>West Germany</i>	Prime Minister Ozal plans to attend <i>Hannover Fair 17-24 April</i> . . [] [] [] an Armenian terrorist attack also is possible since the fair coincides with the 70th anniversary of the alleged genocide of Armenians in Turkey. []	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
<i>May</i> <i>Austria</i>	<i>15 May marks the 30th anniversary of the State Treaty</i> , which restored sovereignty and established Austria's postwar neutrality . . . foreign ministers of the four signatory powers will attend, plus those from the neighboring states . . . press is speculating that a Schultz-Gromyko meeting could presage a Reagan-Gorbachev summit. []	25X1
<i>Yugoslavia</i>	<i>By the time Yugoslav Prime Minister Planinc visits Washington in late May</i> , Belgrade probably will have reached rescheduling agreement with official creditors, removing nagging issue from agenda . . . Planinc will probably urge private investment in Yugoslavia and seek reaffirmation of US support. []	25X1

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